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CHAPTER 1
Introduction générale
La théorie des jeux de champ moyen est une branche nouvelle de la théorie
des jeux introduite par Lasry and Lions 2006a, 2006b et par Huang et al. 2006,
2007. Cette théorie s'attache à l'analyse du comportement limite des jeux dif-
férentiels stochastiques impliquant un grand nombre de petits joueurs rationnels,
chaque joueur ayant très peu d'inﬂuence sur les stratégies utilisées par les autres.
L'équilibre de champ moyen est déﬁni comme la limite de l'équilibre de Nash d'un
jeu diﬀérentiel à N joueurs. Aﬁn de formaliser le comportement d'un continuum
d'agents rationnels, la théorie des jeux à champ moyen s'inspire des méthodes de
la physique statistique dans la modélisation de l'interaction d'un grand nombre
de particules. Les physiciens considèrent chaque particule comme étant inﬂuencée
par un "champ moyen" exercé par toutes les autres particules, tout en prenant en
compte l'inﬂuence de chaque particule sur le champ moyen.
Appliquée en économie, cette théorie suppose que chaque agent est inﬂuencé
par le champ moyen fait de la distribution du comportement des autres joueurs et
considère les conséquences de chaque décision individuelle sur ce champ moyen.
Dans un jeu champ moyen standard, la dynamique du système est régi par
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deux équations : une équation de Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman rétrograde décrivant
la stratégie optimale des agents la répartition des autres joueurs et une équation
de transport de type Kolmogorov qui décrit l'évolution de la distribution de la
population en prenant en compte l'inﬂuence de chaque joueur sur le champ moyen.
L'équilibre de Nash du jeu apparaît comme la solution de ces deux équations.
Le but de cette thèse est de présenter des applications économiques de cette
nouvelle théorie.
Dans le deuxième chapitre de cette thèse, nous présentons formellement la
théorie des jeux à champ moyen. Nous commençons par les jeux statiques et
traitons le cas dérivant d'un potentiel où la résolution est particulièrement simple.
Nous décrivons ensuite le cadre dynamique et mettons en évidence les propriétés
de cette classe de jeux.
Dans le troisième chapitre, nous nous intéressons à la diﬀusion des logiciels
dans un environnement marqué à la fois par des pratiques de piratage et la montée
des logiciels libres. Le choix des utilisateurs évolue ainsi entre trois types de
logiciels : propriétaires, libres et piratés. Nous étudions les stratégies optimales de
l'éditeur du logiciel propriétaire et leurs inﬂuences sur les décisions des utilisateurs
des logiciels. Ce modèle n'est pas à proprement parler de type champ moyen du
fait de la rationalité limitée des agents. Seul l'éditeur du logiciel propriétaire est
considéré rationnel vu ses connaissances du marché qui lui permettent d'anticiper
son évolution.
Dans le quatrième chapitre, nous proposons un modèle de stationnement urbain
avec une population de consommateurs hétérogènes. Dans ce modèle statique à
deux états, chaque consommateur, suivant sa propension à payer, choisit entre
le stationnement sur rue ou le stationnement dans un garage. Nous évaluons
diﬀérentes politiques publiques concernant les tarifs et la durée de stationnement.
Le cinquième chapitre développe un modèle dynamique à champ moyen de com-
pétition entre deux paradigmes scientiﬁques en se basant sur la théorie Kuhnienne
des révolutions scientiﬁques. La dynamique du modèle est guidée par le choix sci-
entiﬁque des jeunes chercheurs au début de leur carrière. Selon les valeurs initiales
des paramètres, le modèle présente un ou deux équilibres stables. Dans chaque
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équilibre, les deux paradigmes coexistent toujours, un paradigme est dominant et
attire la plupart des chercheurs. Le changement de paradigme apparaît comme
la conséquence de deux types de chocs imprévisibles. Un choc sur les fonctions
de production scientiﬁques peut modiﬁer les interactions entre les paradigmes et
favoriser un paradigme au détriment de l'autre. De même, les politiques publiques
peuvent favoriser le changement de paradigme en oﬀrant des incitations tempo-
raires aux jeunes chercheurs.

CHAPTER 2
Présentation des jeux à champ moyen
2.1 Introduction
Nous présentons dans ce chapitre de manière formelle la théorie des jeux à
champ moyen et rappelons quelques résultats d'existence et d'unicité des équilibres
de Nash. Nous commençons par les jeux statiques en détaillant la résolution du
cas dérivant d'un potentiel. Nous exposons, dans un deuxième temps, les jeux
dynamiques et le système d'équations qui caractérisent l'équilibre de Nash. Nous
nous inspirons dans cet exposé de Cardaliaguet 2010 et du cours de Pierre Louis
Lions au collège de France.
2.2 Jeux à champ moyen statiques
Nous considérons dans cette section un jeu avec un grand nombre N de joueurs.
Les joueurs vivent une seule période pendant laquelle ils doivent choisir une stratégie
x ∈ Q où Q est un ensemble compact de R. Notons FNi = FNi (x1, ..., xN) le coût
de chaque joueur i ∈ 1, ...N . Nous supposons que les joueurs sont symétriques ou
6 CHAPTER 2. Présentation des jeux à champ moyen
indistinguables, cela se traduit mathématiquement par la relation suivante :
FNσ(i)(xσ(1), ..., xσ(N)) = Fi(x1, ..., xN)
pour toute permutation σ sur l'ensemble {1, ..., N}.
Cette propriété de symétrie nous permet d'étudier et de caractériser les équili-
bres de Nash pour un très grand nombre de joueurs.
2.2.1 Résultats généraux
Avant d'étudier le comportement des équilibres de Nash pour N tendant vers
l'inﬁni, nous allons examiner le comportement asymptotique de ces fonctions de
coût symétriques.
Deﬁnition. Une fonction U est dite symétique si pour toute permutation σ sur
l'ensemble {1, ..., N}, on a :
U(xσ(1), ..., xσ(N)) = U(x1, ..., xN)
Theorem 1. Soit (UN)N∈N une suite de fonctions symétriques. Supposons que les
fonctions UN sont bornées et uniformément continues alors il existe une fonction
continue et déﬁnie sur l'ensemble des mesures sur l'espace Q, U : P(Q)→ R telle
que
limN→∞ supX∈QN |UN(X)− U(mNX)| = 0
où mNX =
1
N
∑N
i=1 δxi est la mesure empirique associée à la stratégie des joueurs.
Ce théorème permet de simpliﬁer considérablement l'écriture des fonctions FNi
à la limite sous la forme F (x,m) où m est la densité des joueurs.
Le théorème caractérise les équilibres de Nash quand N tend vers l'inﬁni.
Theorem 2. Supposons que, pour tout N, XN = (x¯N1 , ..., x¯
N
N) soit un équilibre de
Nash pour le jeu FN1 , ..., F
N
N . Alors la suite de mesures empiriques m¯
N converge
vers une limite m¯ ∈ P (Q) qui vériﬁe
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∫
Q
F (y, m¯)dm¯(y) = inf
m∈P(Q)
∫
Q
F (y, m¯)dm(y) (2.1)
Cette équation de champ moyen montre que la distribution d'équilibre m¯ ne
charge que les points de minimum de la fonction de coût F (y, m¯).
L'unicité de la mesure m¯ est assurée si la fonction de coût F vériﬁe la condition
de monotonicité suivante
Theorem 3. Supposons que la fonction F vériﬁe la condition de monotonie suiv-
ante :
∫
Q
(F (y,m1)− F (y,m2)d(m1 −m2)(y) > 0 (2.2)
pour toutes mesures m1 et m2 déﬁnies sur l'espace Q, alors il existe au plus une
mesure qui vériﬁe l'équation 2.1.
2.2.2 Un exemple : Le cas dérivant d'un potentiel
La résolution du jeu à champ moyen et spéciﬁquement de l'équation 2.1 devient
particulièrement simple dans le cas dérivant d'un potentiel. Cela correspond au
cas où la fonction F s'écrit F (x,m) = Φ′(m)(x). Prenons l'exemple d'un coût sous
la forme F (x,m) = V (x) +G(m(x)). Chaque joueur cherche à minimiser son coût
F (x,m). La fonction composante V est liée à la position du joueur et exprime
ses préférences géographiques alors que la deuxième composante, G, exprime les
préférences vis-à-vis de la répartition totale des joueurs (attirance ou aversion à la
foule). La résolution du problème revient à trouver la répartition optimale m¯.
Dans ce cas, l'équation 2.1 s'écrit∫
Q
F (x, m¯)dm ≥ ∫
Q
F (x, m¯)dm¯, pour tout distribution m
ce qui équivaut à
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Q
Φ′(x, m¯)(m− m¯) ≥ 0
L'équation de champ moyen 2.1 montre que la distribution m¯ ne charge que
les points de minimum de V (x) +G(m(x)). Par conséquent, nous avons :
V (x) +G(m¯(x)) ≥ λ, pour tout x ∈ Q
V (x) +G(m¯(x)) = λ, pour tout x ∈ supp(m¯)
où λ = miny V (y) +G(m¯(y)) et vériﬁe
∫
Q
dm¯ = 1
Nous pouvons en déduire la forme de la distribution m¯ à l'équilibre:
m¯(x) = G−1((λ− V (x))+)
Dans le cas particulier où
 V (x) = x2 et G(m) = cm avec c > 0, la solution est
m∗(x) =
(λ− x2)+
c
 V (x) = x2 et G(m) = log(m), la solution est
m∗(x) =
1√
2pi
e−
x2
2
2.3 Jeux à champ moyen dynamiques
Nous présentons dans cette partie les jeux à champ moyen dynamiques et le
système d'équilibre qui en découle.
Soit le problème d'optimisation individuel suivant :
 infα E
[∫ T
0
f(Xxt , αt) + g(X
x
t ,mt)dt+ Φ(X
x
T ,mT )
]
dXxt = α(t,X
x
t )dt+ σdWt
(2.3)
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Chaque joueur minimise, sur la période [0, T ], un coût convexe f associé à la
caractéristique du joueur x et au contrôle α, un coût g lié à la distribution globale
des joueurs et un coût ﬁnal Φ.
Soit un joueur ayant la caractéristique x à l'instant t, sa fonction valeur s'écrit
de la manière suivante :
v(t, x) = inf
(αs)s>t,Xxt =x
E
[∫ T
t
f(Xxs , αs) + g(X
x
s ,ms)ds+ Φ(X
x
T ,mT )
]
(2.4)
La résolution du probléme de minimisation 2.3 donne le systéme d'équations suiv-
ant :
{
∂tm− σ22 ∆m+ div(m∂pH(x,∇v)) = 0,m(0, x) = m0(x)
∂tv +
σ2
2
∆v +H(x,∇v) = g(m), v(T, x) = Φ(x,mT )
(2.5)
où le Hamiltonien H(x, p) = f ∗(x, p) = supα(pα− f(x, α)).
La première équation de type kolmogorov est une équation de transport et
décrit l'évolution de la distribution des joueurs au cours du temps. La deuxième
est de type Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman et donne la stratégie individuelle à l'équilibre.

CHAPTER 3
Could Tolerance of Software Piracy Reduce Free Software
Diﬀusion?
This chapter is based on the paper "Could Tolerance of Software Piracy Reduce
Free Software Diﬀusion?" which is a joint work with Heger Attaya.
Abstract
Past research classiﬁes software users in two groups: legal users of a ﬁrm's
proprietary software and illicit users or pirates of that software. However, this
categorization de facto miscounts users of free/open source software. In this chap-
ter, we introduce the free software users and study the dynamics of the software
market when anti-piracy action is applied. Notably, we study the inﬂuence of
anti-piracy action on the shifting of users from one software to another. Based on
the market share of free software and the growth of the market, the proprietary
producer uses optimally a lax policy on piracy (piracy tolerance) and then hardens
its anti-piracy measures after a certain period.
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3.1 Introduction
In the presence of free software alternative, catching back pirate users and
integrating them into the legal market of proprietary software represents a big
challenge for the proprietary editor. In this context, a strategy of piracy tolerance
could sustain a larger user-base for the proprietary software. As Bill Gates said in
2008 about software piracy on China: "It is easier for our software to compete with
Linux when there's piracy rather than when there is not". 1 According to Business
Software Alliance (BSA) annual report in 2008, only 44 % of the installed software
on personal computers are proprietary and properly licensed while 41 % of them
are pirated and the remaining 15 % are free software. 2
In this paper, we aim to display the diﬀerence that free software creates in the
market and model how a producer of proprietary software can optimally tolerate
a certain degree of piracy of his software in response to the confrontation with
free software. We study the case with three types of software users: legal users
who regularly pay for the license, illegal users who do not pay for the proprietary
software and ﬁnally, users of the open-source software which is generally available
for free. We show that the piracy control strategy is applied immediately only
when the global network size of proprietary software, including the illicit versions
of that software, is larger than the free software one. As long as tolerance of piracy
is applied on the market and free software diﬀusion is low, a fraction of users will
prefer using pirated software than free alternative.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the ﬁrst section, we
review the literature on piracy eﬀect, the diﬀerent anti-piracy measures and the
beneﬁcial eﬀects of piracy tolerance strategy. The second section presents the
model of maximization of the proprietary of software producer when there is a risk
that some pirate users shift to the free software. The optimal solution is resolved
in the third section. The fourth section provides a numerical simulation of the
1. Piracy: the Silver Lining. The Economist, July 19th-25th, 2008 ed. p.23.
2. Sixth annual BSA-IDC Global Software, 2008, Piracy study.
The study is about 110 individual countries. Available at :
http://global.bsa.org/idcglobalstudy2008/studies/globalpiracy2008.
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model for various values of the network size and discusses the consequences of this
anti-piracy strategy on the software market. The optimal anti-piracy strategy will
be discussed in three diﬀerent cases under the consideration for a certain expansion
for the market growth. The last section concludes the paper.
3.2 Literature review of piracy eﬀect
It is frequently claimed by proprietary software producers that software piracy
is a theft causing important losses. Actually, the global piracy rate is accounted
by BSA for 42% which causes estimated losses to software industry about 63.4
billion dollars. 3
The classic way to reduce piracy is by lowering the software price as high prices
induce piracy. But that reduces proﬁts as well as investment incentives. Conse-
quently, a producer of proprietary software has to weigh cost piracy control and
potential beneﬁts which suggests that sometimes he decides not to control piracy
(opportunity cost). Research about piracy of digital products suggests reinforce-
ment of copyright protection as a way to control piracy (Novos and Waldman 1984;
Johnson 1985). The main anti-piracy measures include formal laws enforcement.
The French Intellectual Property Code in its article L.335-3 for instance, deﬁnes
piracy of software as any violation of intellectual property rights: "All violation of
author rights of software is (...) a counterfeiting crime." 4 In the United States,
the "Copyright Act" of 1976 is the federal statute governing copyright law and
granting "Congress" the power to promote copyright law such as the "Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act" introduced in 1998. However, enforcing the law is not
an easy task. Recently, two proposed laws against piracy were rejected by the
Congress during 2012: the "SOPA" (Stop Online Piracy Act) and "PIPA" (Pro-
tect IP Act). In France, the main law against piracy, the Hadopi law, introduced
in 2009, is still also diﬃcult to apply. 5
3. Global Study 2011, Ninth Annual BSA and IDC Global Software Piracy Study http:
//globalstudy.bsa.org/2011/
4. Free translation. La propriété littéraire et artistique, Livre Ier, Le Droit D'Auteur, Titre
II, Droits des Auteurs, Chapitre II , Droits patrimoniaux.
5. Haute autorité pour la diﬀusion des oeuvres et la protection des droits sur internet. See the
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Diﬀerent methods and various anti-piracy measures have been therefore de-
vised to prevent illegal reproduction of software. Firstly, some researches pro-
pose that producers should price discriminate and charge some customers more
than others King and Lampe 2003. Takeyama 1994 proposes to distinguish be-
tween "high-valuation" consumers and "low-valuation" and notes that considering
price discrimination simultaneously with the anti-piracy strategy is an optimal
strategy to lock all users. 6 According to Shy and Thisse 1999 producers should
price discriminate between consumers who need the software supported services
"support-oriented" and those who do not "support-independent". They show that
the ﬁrst ones are attracted by the original product and the second ones by the
unauthorized copying. 7 Moreover, Slive and Dan 1998 note that strategies of
price discrimination between "business and home" users seem to combat software
piracy by charging business pirates higher prices.
Secondly, detecting the unauthorized copies can be managed by elaborating
technical measures. In the case of illegal downloading music for example, Peitz
and Waelbroeck 2006 propose to eliminate piracy by insetting additional resources
in a technology that increases the detection probability of piracy. They note
that for digital products (e.g. music, video and computer games), a targeted
enforcement policy and additional investment on technology can reduce piracy
without aﬀecting the ﬁrm's proﬁt. More precisely, Peitz and Waelbroeck 2006
suggest that the eﬀect of piracy depends on the characteristics of the industry.
They propose two possibilities either by technical measures or by lowering the
price and conclude that for the speciﬁc case of software industry the eﬀect of
piracy is less than in the music and movie industries. Haruvy et al. 2004 suggest
furthermore that protection of software can be managed by developing a hardware
design that makes use of illegal software diﬃcult. Actually, the known technical
protection for software piracy is mainly enforced by Digital Rights Management
inventory of Hadopi application in the French Congress website, published the 25th december
2012. http://questions.assemblee-nationale.fr/q14/14-3096QE.htm
6. Takeyama 1994 provides a similar analysis of a price-setting monopoly than the one of
Conner and Rumelt 1991.
7. Shy and Thisse 1999 model how piracy can be used strategically to confront competitors
when network eﬀects are not large.
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(DRM) technologies used by hardware producers and proprietary software editors
to limit the copy of the software. 8 There exists more sophisticated means of
material protection including the "Online license key" that check instantly with
the web site if the software has a registration code, such as "Windows Genuine
Advantage".
Finally, legal actions against software piracy are backed up by the governments
international alliances, as Business Software Alliance (BSA), Software and Infor-
mation Industry Association (SIIA) or International Federation of Phonographic
Industry (IFPI).
However, several researchers ﬁnd that software producers can beneﬁt from
piracy, because a ﬁrm whose software product is pirated beneﬁts from a larger
network size (Conner and Rumelt 1991; Takeyama 1994; Shy and Thisse 1999).
The network size of software implies that each additional user raises the value for
the existing users as well as the future adopters of the software (Katz and Shapiro
1985). Under these conditions, this line of research shows that piracy tolerance
strategy creates a higher user-base due to the lock-in eﬀects and maximizes the
value of the network that balances the opportunity cost of no controling piracy.
Shy and Thisse 1999 claim that when network eﬀects are strong, tolerance of
piracy is an equilibrium for a competitive software industry. 9 According to Haruvy
et al. 2004, piracy tolerance is speciﬁcally useful for newly launched software when
it is strategically managed through price and protection measures. They observe
for instance that some ﬁrms often allow the use of shareware versions after their
expiration date (e.g. WinZip). Givon et al. 1997 mentioned the example of the
spreadsheet program MS Excel and argue that the large user-base is probably due
to Microsoft's tolerance for piracy. Furthermore, Prasda and Mahajan 2003 model
the optimal number of pirates to tolerate and show that a monopoly should start
with a minimum protection and then impose a maximum protection once the soft-
ware has diﬀused half way. Here, we argue that tolerating some piracy can also
8. Apple and Iphone applications is the most knowing example of rendering programs hard
to be reproduced illegally.
9. This result obtained in duopoly framework is an extension of the one found by Conner and
Rumelt 1991 in a price-setting monopoly.
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be justiﬁed by the presence of free software on the market (Gaudeul 2008; Econo-
mides and Katsamakas 2006). Partly, due to the voluntary contribution of the free
communities: more opportunities to ﬁx bugs and to improve the functionality and
user interface of the software (Bonaccorsi and Ross 2003). In this context, what
should a producer of proprietary software do against piracy? For the producer, it
is important to understand the eﬀect of an anti-piracy action as it is still diﬃcult
to deter pirates when there is a risk that they switch to free software alternative
(stealing market eﬀect of free software). We examine therefore, the optimal de-
cisions of a proprietary software producer regarding piracy in the context of free
software competition.
3.3 A model of software market
3.3.1 The model
We consider one ﬁrm producing a particular proprietary software. We model
the market continuously throughout the ﬁnite life of the software [0, T ]. The
producer of proprietary software is in a monopoly situation. But there is a threat
of piracy and one free alternative for that software. 10 The free software is available
at no cost. The production of proprietary software is assumed to be constant per
period and the software price equal to 1. The producer of proprietary software
seeks to maximize his market share by choosing an appropriate anti-piracy policy
to confront both piray and free software. For simplicity, the cost of the anti-piracy
strategy is assumed to be zero 11.
We consider a continuum of size N of users that grows at a ﬁxed rate r, namely
N˙(t) = rN(t). We include three groups of software users: legal users of proprietary
software who are willing to purchase it, illegal users who prefer to risk and obtain
the pirated software, and users who are not willing to pay the price of software and
10. Others cases are possible: many free alternatives for the proprietary software and many
other proprietary software competitors.
11. This assumption is not very restrictive because if there is cost, the incentive to be tolerant
is enhanced.
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prefer the free software alternative. 12 The switching of users between the three
types of software impacts the market share of proprietary software.
The solution used here is an optimal control over a ﬁnite horizon. This method-
ology is suitable because the producer of proprietary software is able to vary its
anti-piracy strategy over the life cycle of the software according to the evolution
of his market share. 13
Description of the proprietary software producer program
The objective of a producer is to maximize his market share over the lifetime
of the software or, equivalently here, the number of legal users purchasing the
proprietary software.
The eﬀorts devoted to piracy, as producer of proprietary software applies con-
trol or tolerance of piracy, are represented by the variable "s" with s(t) ∈ [0, 1].
The situation s = 1 corresponds to a rigid anti-piracy strategy and conversely
s = 0 corresponds to a total tolerance of piracy. In case of increases in anti-piracy
actions such as heavier prosecutions of pirates or more sophisticated means of ma-
terial protection, the share of pirates user will decrease and the risk that some
of pirates would switch to free software alternative will increase. The proprietary
software ﬁrm is willing to attract pirates by relaxing the anti-piracy measures so
that in the future more users adopt their product. The problem of the producer is
to decide to what degree tolerate piracy over time in order to increase the number
of his legal users and thereby confront both piracy and free software substitution.
The maximization program of the proprietary producer depends thereby both
on the number of legal users and the strategy devoted to piracy. The maximization
problem is detailed in section 4.
12. The most important example of such a model is the market of PC operating system and
the competition between Windows and Linux.
13. Dynamic models of markets with network externalities have been frequently used in the
literature. For instance, Haruvy et al. 2004, 2008 extend the static analysis on software market
to a dynamic framework.
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Description of the evolution of the population of users
We analyze herein the market shares of the software market according to the
movement of the population of users. The population of users is described in
continuous time during the life time of the software: 14
N(t) = NP (t) +NI(t) +NF (t),∀t ∈ [0, T ]
Where:
 NP indicates the users of proprietary software
 NI indicates the users of pirated software
 NF indicates the users of the free software.
The evolution of the population of users is analysed under the assumptions
that:
 the learning eﬀects explain the relative attraction of the diﬀerent populations.
 the learning eﬀects are proportionnal to the size of the population of users
of a given software, as established expertise among users raises the value for
the new adopters.
We have simultaneously users going from NI to NP and reversely from NP to NI
(for any given level of control). The attractions depend on the schemes of the
encounter between users which may present diverse conﬁgurations. 15
Speciﬁcally, the evolution of the population of users of proprietary software NP
is expressed by the following equation:
N˙P (t) = a1(NP (t) +NI(t))− a2NF (t) + a3s(t)NI(t)− a4(1− s(t))NP (t) (3.1)
The learning eﬀects in the population of users of free software will lead to attract
a2NF , who will leave the population of users of proprietary software. Similarly,
the high attraction of the proprietary software explain its encounter between some
legal and illegal users (a1(NP +NI)). In consequence of a control piracy strategy
implementation, some pirates will increase the network size of proprietary software
14. In this paper, we chose to focus on the global population evolution regarding network size
and anti-piarcy policy. The individual preferences are not explicity modeled here.
15. These encounters may also concern new users and population of old users.
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(a3NI) and conversely because of piracy tolerance, a proportion of legal users are
unwilling to pay for the software (a4NP ).
Looking at the population of users of pirated software, the evolution of this
population is as follows:
N˙I(t) = b1(NP (t)+NI(t))−b2NF (t)−b3(t)s(t)NI(t)+a4(1−s(t))NP (t)+b4(1−s(t))NF (t)
(3.2)
Similar learning eﬀects and parameters interpretations about b1 and b2 are as-
sumed. The learning eﬀects in the population of users of free software will lead to
attract b2NF , who will leave the population of illegal users of proprietary software
and join the community of free software users. The beneﬁt from the proprietary
network is given by (b1(NP +NI)). When an anti-piracy strategy is applied (s=1),
some pirates will increase the network size of both the proprietary software and
the free software (b3NI). Conversely, because of piracy tolerance (s=0), some legal
and free software users are unwilling to pay for the software and become illegal
users in proportion a4NP and b4NF .
We interpret the equations above as the global evolution for each population
group .
Description of the shifting market share
We can try to express the system of equations above in terms of market shares,
so as to be able to simulate the distribution of market shares between the three
populations of users, given a certain law of expansion for the overall market.
Let SP (t), SI(t) and SF (t) be the relative market shares, then SP (t)+ SI(t) +
SF (t)=1 and let N(t) be the overall size of the market.
For a given type of software j ∈ P, I, F , we have :
S˙j(t) =
d
dt
(
Nj(t)
N(t)
) =
N(t)N˙j(t)−Nj(t)N˙(t)
N2(t)
=
N˙j(t)
N(t)
− Nj(t)
N(t)
(
N˙(t)
N(t)
)
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hence
N˙j(t)
N(t)
= S˙j(t) + (Sj(t))(
N˙(t)
N(t)
)
The rate of growth of the market N˙
N
is assumed to be equal to r. Then the
expression of the evolution of the market share Sj is given by :
S˙j(t) =
N˙j(t)
N(t)
− rSj(t) (3.3)
The equations (3.1) and (3.2) can therefore be expressed in terms of market shares
Sj as follows :
S˙P (t) = a1(SP (t) + SI(t))− a2SF (t) + a3s(t)SI(t)− a4(1− s(t))SP − rSP (t)
S˙I(t) = b1(SP (t) + SI(t))− b2SF (t)− b3s(t)SI(t) + a4(1− s(t))SP (t)
+b4(1− s(t))SF (t)− rSI(t)
(3.4)
3.3.2 Proﬁt-maximizing strategy against piracy
We can now write the proprietary producer's maximization program as follows:
maxs(t)∈[0,1]
∫ T
0
SP (t, s (t)) dt. (3.5)
under the constraints :
S˙P (t) = a1(SP (t) + SI(t))− a2SF (t) + a3s(t)SI(t)− a4(1− s(t))SP (t)− rSP (t)
S˙I(t) = b1(SP (t) + SI(t))− b2SF (t)− b3s(t)SI(t) + a4(1− s(t))SP (t)
+b4(1− s(t))SF (t)− rSI(t)
(3.6)
The maximization problem (3.5) with constraints (3.6) is solvable by the Pon-
tryagin's Maximum Principle which is commonly used in optimal control theory
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(Seierstad and Sydsaeter 1987).
The following proposition provides the main result of the paper and describes
the optimal strategy of the proprietary software producer. It states that the anti-
piracy action is applied only after a certain time denoted t∗.
Proposition. There is t∗ ∈ [0, T ] such that the optimal strategy s∗ is given by:
s∗(t) =
{
0 if t ≤ t∗
1 if t > t∗
(3.7)
Proof. The proof of this proposition is based on the Pontryagin theorem. We will
ﬁrst recall the statement of the theorem and then we will turn to the demonstration
of the proposition.
The Pontryagin theorem and the necessary conditions
Let T ∈ ]0,∞[, Ω is a non empty open set of Rn, U ⊂ Rm and η ∈ Ω.
f0 : [0, T ]× Ω× U → R, and f : [0, T ]× Ω× U → Rn.
Let f0 and f be regular functions. The maximization problem is given by
max
∫ T
0
f0(t, x(t), u(t))dt
{
∀t ∈ [0, T ], x˙(t) = f(t, x(t), u(t))
x (0) = η
In our case, the function f0 is equal to the function NP (t), u to the strategy s and
x to the number of users N.
The Hamiltonian H: [0, T ]× Rn × U × Rn × R is deﬁned by :
H (t, x, u, p, p0) = p0f0 (t, x, u) + p · f (t, x, u)
Let (x (t) , u (t)) be an optimal process, then there exists a function p : [0, T ]→ Rn
such that:
1. p(T ) = 0
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2. ∀t ∈ [0, T ], p˙(t) = −Hx(t, x(t), u(t), p(t), 1)
We denote the derivative of H with respect to x by Hx.
3. ∀t ∈ [0, T ], ∀u ∈ U , H(t, x(t), u(t), p(t), 1) ≥ H(t, x(t), u, p(t), 1)
Proof of the proposition We ﬁrst calculate the adjoint function P(t) and
present then the optimal control solution s∗ that maximizes the market share pro-
prietary software N∗P during the lifetime of the software.
Let a = a1 + a2 and b = b1 + b2.
From the necessary conditions theorem, the adjoint variables verify the following
system of diﬀerential equations:
p˙1(t) = −HSP (t, S(t), s∗(t), P (t))
= (−a+ r + a4(1− s∗(t)))p1(t)− (b− b4(1− s∗(t))
+a4(1− s∗(t))p2(t)− 1
p˙2(t) = −HSI (t, S(t), s∗(t), P (t))
= − (a+ a3s∗(t)) p1 (t)− (b− r − b3s∗(t)− b4 (1− s∗(t))) p2 (t)
p1 (T ) = p2 (T ) = 0
Hence, the adjoint function P(t) veriﬁes :
P˙ (t) =
(
p1(t)
p2(t)
)
= A (t)× P (t) +B
P (T ) = 0
where
B =
(
−1
0
)
andA(t) =
(
−a+ r + a4 (1− s∗(t)) −b+ (b4 − a4)(1− s∗(t))
−a− a3s∗(t) −b+ r + b3s∗(t) + b4 (1− s∗(t))
)
The solution of this equation is :
P (t) =
(
p1(t)
p2(t)
)
= − ∫ T
t
(e−
∫ τ
t A(r)drB)dτ
We turn now to the evolution of the market shares N(t). The equation (3.6) can
be written as follow:
S˙(t) = C (t) ∗ S (t) +D (t)
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Where C (t) =
(
a− r − a4 (1− s∗ (t)) a+ a3s∗ (t)
b− (b4 − a4)(1− s∗(t)) b− r − b3s∗(t)− b4 (1− s∗ (t))
)
and
D (t) =
(
−a2
−b2 + b4 (1− s∗ (t))
)
The solution of this equation is given by:
S∗ (t) = e
∫ t
0 C(r)drS0 +
∫ t
0
e
∫ t
τ C(r)drD (τ) dτ
Finally, the optimal control s∗ maximizes the Hamiltonian H, then:
H (t, S(t), s, P (t)) = f0 (t, S (t) , s) + p (t) · f (t, S (t) , s)
= p1 [a (SP + SI)− a2 + a3sSI − a4 (1− s)SP − rSP ]
+p2[(b− b4(1− s))(SP + SI)− b2 − b3sSI + a4(1− s)SP + b4(1− s)
−rSI ] + SP
= [(a3SI + a4SP ) p1 − ((b3 − b4)SI + (a4 − b4)SP + b4) p2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=g(t)
s
+ k (S(t), p(t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
independent of s
hence
if g(t) > 0 then s∗ = 1.
if g(t) ≤ 0 then s∗ = 0
The threshold t∗ is the solution of the equation g(t) = 0.
It will be interesting to see how a market in expansion (r>0) or in recession
(r<0) modiﬁes the conclusions.
3.4 Simulation of the eﬀect of anti-piracy action
on the shifting market share
We simulate in this section the eﬀect of the anti-piracy action on the population
of users and the market shares of the three types of software. We show that piracy
tolerance strategy reduces eﬃciently software piracy when the network size of free
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software is weak. More precisely, we distinguish three cases depending on the
initial population of users as follows: 16
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
NP 0.3 0.3 0.05
NI 0.35 0.1 0.35
NF 0.35 0.6 0.6
Table 3.1: Diverse conﬁgurations of initial market shares
We extend the study to a situation of a certain expansion for the market with
a growth rate of ±5%.
3.4.1 Case 1: Equal market shares
We suppose in this ﬁrst case that the eco-system of the software market is
approximately equally shared between proprietary software, free software alterna-
tive and pirated versions. As an example the case of Adobe Photoshop which is
estimated in 2010 by BSA to be the most pirated software on the Internet. The
free alternative competing with Adobe Photoshop is the GNU Image Manipulation
Program (GIMP) which works with numerous operating systems including Mac
OS X and Microsoft Windows.
The simulation points that for both conﬁgurations of a market in expansion or
in recession, the optimal solution are an immediate anti-piracy action applied at
t∗ = 0. The proprietary software producer succeed to create a high lock-in eﬀect
of pirate users and a high stealing market eﬀect of free users.
This ﬁrst result is conﬁrmed by classic research suggesting severe actions on
digital products piracy. Under the condition of equal initial market shares between
the three groups of users, an immediate piracy control can be then proﬁtable for
the producer as it prevents both the size of piracy and the free software network
from growing. The global network size of proprietary software plays herein an
16. We ﬁx the values of ai and bi as follows: a1 = 0.45, a2 = 0.4, a3 = 0.4, b1 = 0.25, b2 =
0.3, b3 = 0.8, b4 = 0.5.
3.4. Simulation of the eﬀect of anti-piracy action on the shifting market share 25
Figure 3.1: Case 1 when market decreases
important role in lock-in the market for new launched free/open source software
even if the total number of software users decreases .
3.4.2 Case 2: When free software is preferred to piracy and
proprietary software
In this second case, we depict the dynamic of software market when the free
software is in a quasi monopoly situation, such as the use of the free web browser
Mozilla-ﬁrefox which was the ﬁrst competitor to Microsoft's Internet Explorer.
Simulations show that at the ﬁrst period, consequent to the piracy tolerance,
the number of pirate users increases independently of the trend of the market
growth. In the second period when anti-piracy is applied, the market share of
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Figure 3.2: Case 1 when market increases
pirated software decreases relatively only when the market is in expansion. When
the market is in recession, an early control strategy cannot involve reducing piracy
enforcement over time because in the early period of the life cycle of software
the producer aims at gaining from network eﬀects and at the later stages of the
life cycle this incentive diminishes. Pirate users are then locked momentarily only
because it is tolerated to use pirated versions. The application of a piracy tolerance
strategy, allows therefore producer of proprietary software to increase his market
share in a recessed market. The stealing market eﬀect, by comparison to the case
1, is low in this case. By opposition, when the market is in expansion (r>0), we
observed that pirate users will prefer to use free software than proprietary software.
The producer of proprietary software does not succeed in catching pirate users.
In parallel, the market share of free software increases. Thus the application of
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Figure 3.3: Case 2 when market decreases
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Figure 3.4: Case 2 when market increases
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piracy tolerance strategy allows producer only to maintain relatively his position
in the market.
3.4.3 Case 3: When free software and piracy are preferred
to proprietary software
We suppose in this last case, that free software and pirated versions are pre-
ferred to proprietary software. Hence, we assume that widespread unauthorized
copies of proprietary software is similar to the case of Windows in China as an-
nounced by Bill Gates in 2008.
The simulation show that initially, the piracy tolerance is applied for a longer
time until t∗ (close to 0.3). The control action later leads to reduce the propor-
tion of pirate users when the market is in recession. But the market share of free
software remains nearly identical after controlling is applied. Under these consid-
erations, proprietary software seems to have a high lock-in eﬀect and a low stealing
market eﬀect when the market is in decrease. Instead, piracy tolerance strategy
has no eﬀect on reducing the group of free software users when the market is in
expansion as free software market share increases after controlling is applied. This
last result shows that the dynamics of the software market impacts the free soft-
ware progression probably supported by the free community. It seems then that
in a context of diﬀusion of piracy, the tolerance of piracy strategy is eﬃcient in
maintaining the market share of proprietary software.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we study the impact of anti-piracy action on the market share of
a given software when free software is an alternative to proprietary software. The
model makes two principal contributions. First, we have considered the software
market as a combination of three competitive products: proprietary, free software
and pirated software. The analysis extends the previously piracy literature on
network externalities to a free software framework. Comparing these results with
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Figure 3.5: Case 3 when market decreases
standard assumptions in the literature about piracy and about free software, the
model is more realistic in its analysis of the three users group. The optimal anti-
piracy strategy is discussed in three diﬀerent cases under the consideration for
a certain expansion for the market growth. It shows under certain conditions,
that early piracy tolerance can be proﬁtable for the proprietary software producer
because it prevents the size of the free software network from growing. In cases
where the free software market share is very large and the piracy diﬀusion is low
within a dynamic software market, the application of anti-piracy action has no
eﬀect on reducing free software competition. It also shows that larger the pirates
group is, the more diﬃcult it becomes to control piracy and the more tolerant a
strategy will be applied.
Finally, it should be reemphasized that the software market consists of three
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Figure 3.6: Case 3 when market increases
competitive products and that the producer has to decide between controlling or
allowing piracy by taking account of the free software substitution risk and the
dynamic growth of the market. This analysis, of course, does not take into account
the price strategy of the proprietary software's producer. Extension of our model
to endogenize price variable is an important complement to the current analysis.

CHAPTER 4
Downtown Parking with Heterogeneous Consumers
Abstract
This chapter studies a parking model with a population of heterogeneous con-
sumers. Each consumer, according to her willingness to pay, chooses between
parking on-street or parking in a garage. Formulating the model as a two-state
mean ﬁeld game, we prove the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium. We
also prove the existence of a social optimum and study its properties, in particular
we show that this optimum does not depend on the on-street price. A numerical
example with a uniform distribution of willingness to pay investigates the optimal
parking policy.
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4.1 Introduction
It is a well known fact that all big cities in the world confront parking problems.
Several measures can be initiated to remedy to this problem. For example, the
investigation conducted by the CERTU 1 in 2005 in the French cities with over 20
000 inhabitants shows that local governments intervene in the market not only by
imposing parking fees and maximum length of stay but also develop formulas for
speciﬁc users : residents, mobile professionals ... (CERTU 2008).
Since the seminal work of Vickrey 1969, the theoretical literature of parking
policy extensively treated the problems related to parking search, choice behavior
and optimal pricing policies (Anderson and De Palma 2004; Calthrop and Proost
2006). It is suggested that when the oﬀ-street market is supplied under constant
returns to scale, street prices must equal garage prices in order to achieve optimal-
ity (Calthrop and Proost 2006).
However, these models do not take into account the heterogeneity of agents.
This paper makes a ﬁrst step in this direction by assuming heterogeneity among
agents in their willingness to pay and investigates the eﬀect of this kind of hetero-
geneity on the pricing policy.
We construct a simple model in the line of Calthrop and Proost 2006 in which
a consumer goes downtown for leisure or shopping activities and decides where to
park. Each agent has two strategies and decides according to his willingness to pay
to either look for a vacant spot on-street or to go directly to a parking garage. This
equilibrium parking model with a continuum of heterogeneous agents enables us to
analyze the optimal parking policy and its eﬀects on the allocation of consumers
between on-street parking and parking garage.
Our model is formulated as a game with a continuum of players (i.e. con-
sumers). Each player has to make a binary choice between looking for a vacant
spot on-street or going directly to a parking garage. This model is a simple case of
the " Mean Field Games ". In our speciﬁc model, we prove the existence and the
uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium. At equilibrium, a consumer whose willingness
1. Centre d'études sur les réseaux, les transports, l'urbanisme et les constructions publiques.
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to pay is less than a threshold value searches on-street, and a consumer whose
willingness to pay is greater than this threshold goes to the parking garage. We
also establish the existence of a social optimal threshold. An interesting result of
the social optimal threshold is that it does not depend on the on-street price.
We also evaluate diﬀerent policies including pricing policies and maximum
length of stay restrictions. We show that an increase of on-street price may alle-
viate congestion and reduce the ineﬃciency of the equilibrium but has a negative
impact on the social welfare. The reduction of the garage parking price is an ef-
fective policy to mitigate congestion and to improve the social welfare. Finally,
reducing the maximum length of stay does not help reduce congestion in cities but
has a positive impact on social welfare.
There is a growing interest in economics for games with discrete choice involv-
ing a large number of heterogeneous players. An and Zhang 2012 developed a
similar model to study traﬃc congestion. Commuters make a binary choice be-
tween riding a bus and driving private vehicles. They addressed the issue of a
gasoline tax and its eﬃciency. Daniels et al. 2013 used Global Games techniques
to study the allocation of order ﬂow between a crossing network and a dealer
market. Such models are very useful to understand the eﬀect of heterogeneity and
allow the removal of the multiplicity of equilibria that emerged in models assuming
homogeneity.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our main assumptions.
In Section 3, we show the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium and dis-
cuss some of its properties. Section 4 is devoted to the welfare analysis and the
properties of the social optimum. In section 5, we study the case of the uniform
distribution of willingness to pay. A last section concludes.
4.2 The model
We consider a continuum of measure one of risk-neutral consumers. Each
consumer, who might be a shopper or a tourist driver, goes to downtown and tries
to park for a period of time t, and then exits. Once he arrives downtown, two
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strategies are available : looking for a vacant spot on-street where the meter rate
is p1 per unit of time (though this outcome is uncertain since the total supply of
on-street parking is ﬁnite) or parking in a parking garage at rate p2 per unit of
time. We assume that, p1 < p2.
Each consumer has her/his own willingness to pay θ in the interval [θ, θ], and
is distributed according to a diﬀerential cumulative distribution function F. We
denote f the probability density function.
4.2.1 Rationing rule
The stock of on-street parking is ﬁxed such that the total demand equals on-
street supply when each individual parks for Q units of time and the number of
garage parking spaces is assumed to be suﬃciently high. We assume in our model
that the time of parking t is larger than Q, so that the total on-street supply is not
suﬃcient to satisfy the total demand of the consumers. If demand for on-street
parking is larger than supply, the excess demand is rationed stochastically. The
probability of ﬁnding a vacant spot is given by
pi(α,Q) = min{1, Q
αt
}
where, α is the proportion of consumers who choose to search for a spot on-street.
As stressed by Calthrop and Proost 2006 "This rationing rule is justiﬁed if
drivers arrive in downtown area more or less at random. We consider this well
suited to modeling parking in city centers for shopping, tourism and leisure activ-
ities. It is clearly far less suited to modeling workplace parking, where spots are
often reserved."
4.2.2 Decision rule
For a consumer with a willingness to pay θi, the certain payoﬀ from parking in
a garage parking is given by
U1(θi, p2) = θi − p2
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and the expected payoﬀ from searching for a vacant spot on-street is given by
U0(θi, α, p1) = pi(α,Q)(θi − p1)
Where α is the proportion of consumers who choose to look for a vacant spot
on-street. U0 is equal to the probability of ﬁnding a vacant spot times the surplus
of the consumer. We assume here that a consumer who cannot ﬁnd a spot gets a
utility equal to zero and quits downtown.
Moreover, we consider two assumptions in our model.
Assumption A1 The meter rate per unit of time p1 < θ
This assumption ensures that the consumer with the minimum willingness to
pay θ can at least park his car on-street. Otherwise, he gets a negative utility and
she/he cannot choose any of the two possibilities.
Assumption A2 The meter rate of garage parking p2 < θ
This assumption is also quite natural since it guarantees that a fraction of the
population receives a positive utility by parking in the garage.
4.3 Equilibrium
In this section, we show the existence and the uniqueness of a non-trivial equi-
librium and discuss some of its properties.
4.3.1 Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium
Deﬁnition 1 A strategy is a function g : [θ, θ]→ {0, 1} such that
g(θi) =
{
1 if the consumer chooses to search for a spot on-street,
0 if the consumer decides to park in a garage parking.
Deﬁnition 2 Given (p1, p2), a Nash equilibrium is a pair (g, α?) such that
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 For all θi ∈ [θ, θ] the optimal strategy g(θi) is given by
g(θi) =
{
1 if U0(θi, α?, p1) ≥ U1(θi, p2),
0 if U1(θi, p2) > U0(θi, α?, p1).
 The proportion α? veriﬁes α? = E[g(θ)].
An equivalent deﬁnition of an equilibrium is a pair (θ?, α?) where
 The threshold θ? veriﬁes U0(θ?, α?, p1) = U1(θ?, p2) or θ? = θ
 The proportion α? satisﬁes α? = F (θ?)
This means that consumers whose willingness to pay is less than θ? decide to
search for a vacant spot on-street and those whose willingness to pay is greater
than θ? decide to park in the garage.
The following theorem states the existence and the uniqueness of a nontrivial
Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 4. Given p1,p2,Q,t and the distribution F, if we assume that θ >
p2−Qt p1
1−Q
t
then there exists a unique non-trivial Nash equilibrium (θ?, α?) which satisﬁes
θ? =
p2 − Qα?tp1
1− Q
α?t
(4.1)
and the probability of ﬁnding a spot on-street is given by
pi(α?, Q) =
Q
α?t
< 1 (4.2)
Proof. See Appendix
Remark : If θ ≤ p2−
Q
t
p1
1−Q
t
then the only Nash Equilibrium is the trivial equilib-
rium (θ?, α?) = (θ, 1) where all consumers reject the parking garage and decide to
look for a vacant spot on-street.
4.3.2 Properties of the equilibrium
In the previous section, we established the existence and uniqueness of a non-
trivial equilibrium. It is interesting to study its properties and conduct compara-
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tive statics.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium threshold θ? is strictly greater than p2.
Proof. Suppose that the equilibrium threshold θ? ≤ p2. For a consumer with a
willingness to pay θi = θ? :
U0(θi, α) = pi(α,Q)(θi − p1) > 0
since pi(α,Q) = min{1, Q
αt
} > 0 and θi = θ? > p1 by assumption A1, and
U1(θi, α) = (θi − p2) ≤ 0
Then, the condition U0(θi, α) = U1(θi, α) is not satisﬁed and θ? is not an equilib-
rium.
The two following propositions study the eﬀect of the on-street rate p1 and the
parking garage rate p2 on the equilibrium proportion of consumers α?.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium proportion of consumers who choose to search
for a spot in the street α? is decreasing in p1.
Proof. To show this result we diﬀerentiate Eq(4.1) with respect to p1 which yields
to
dθ?
dp1
− 1 = t
Q
F ′(θ?)
dθ?
dp1
(θ? − p2) + t
Q
F (θ?)
dθ?
dp1
Hence
(1− t
Q
F ′(θ?)(θ? − p2)− t
Q
F (θ?))
dθ?
dp1
= 1
Then
dθ?
dp1
=
1
1− t
Q
F (θ?)− t
Q
F ′(θ?)(θ? − p2)
We have shown that pi(α,Q) = Q
αt
< 1 and θ? > p2, then the denominator of the
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right hand side is negative. As a result, dθ
?
dp1
< 0. Recall that α? = F (θ?), we have
dα?
dp1
=
dα?
dθ?
θ?
dp1
= F ′(θ?)
θ?
dp1
< 0
Proposition 3 The equilibrium proportion of consumers who choose to search for
a spot in the street α? is increasing in p2.
Proof. To show this result, we diﬀerentiate equation(4.1) with respect to p2 which
yields
dθ?
dp2
=
t
Q
F ′(θ?)
dθ?
dp2
(θ? − p2) + t
Q
F (θ?)(
dθ?
dp2
− 1)
Hence
(1− t
Q
F (θ?)− t
Q
F ′(θ?)(θ? − p2))dθ
?
dp2
= − t
Q
F (θ?)
Then
dθ?
dp2
=
− t
Q
F (θ?)
1− t
Q
F (θ?)− t
Q
F ′(θ?)(θ? − p2) > 0
This result states that the number of consumers whose willingness to pay is
greater than p2 decreases, implying that the proportion of consumers who decide
to look for a vacant spot on-street will increase.
4.4 Welfare analysis
Let us consider the optimal proportion of consumers α˜, or equivalently, the
optimal threshold θ˜, that maximizes the expected total payoﬀ. If θ˜ is a threshold
value, then consumers whose willingness to pay is less than θ˜ will choose to park
in the street and those whose willingness to pay is greater than θ˜ will choose to go
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to the garage parking. Then the total expected payoﬀ is given by
U(θ˜) =
∫ θ˜
θ
U0(θ, α˜)m(θ)dθ +
∫ θ
θ˜
U1(θ, α˜)m(θ)dθ.
The ﬁrst term of the right hand side corresponds to the total expected payoﬀ of
consumers who choose to search for a vacant spot on-street and the second term
is equal to the total expected payoﬀ of consumers who choose to go to garage
parking.
4.4.1 Existence of a social optimum
The theorem below states the existence of an optimal proportion α˜ or equiva-
lently an optimal threshold θ˜.
Theorem 5. Suppose the assumption A1 holds, then
 An optimal threshold value θ˜ exists.
 The equilibrium is ineﬃcient : the equilibrium threshold θ? is larger than
the optimal threshold θ˜ or equivalently the equilibrium proportion α? is larger
than α˜.
Proof. See Appendix
4.4.2 Properties of the social optimum
Similar to the equilibrium, we conduct some comparative statics on the optimal
threshold θ˜. We show that an increase in the garage rate p2 leads to the same eﬀect
on the equilibrium threshold θ? and the optimal threshold θ˜ but the latter does
not depend on the on-street rate p1.
Proposition 4 The optimal threshold θ˜ does not depend on p1.
Proof. It is straightforward from the deﬁnition of the total expected payoﬀ U.
Indeed,
U(θ) = Q
F (θ)t
[
∫ θ
θ
sf(s)ds− p1F (θ)] +
∫ θ
θ
sf(s)ds− p2(1− F (θ))
= Q
F (θ)t
(
∫ θ
θ
sf(s)ds)− Q
t
p1 +
∫ θ
θ
sf(s)ds− p2(1− F (θ))
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Therefore, argmaxθ{U(θ)} = argmaxθ{U(θ) + Qt p1} and U(θ) + Qt p1 does not
depend on p1 then θ˜ which maximizes the total expected utility U does not depend
on p1.
Proposition 5 The optimal threshold θ˜ is increasing in p2.
Proof. To show that θ˜ is increasing in p2, we distinguish three cases :
 If θ˜ is such that Q
α˜t
= 1 then θ˜ does not depend in p2 since α˜ = F (θ˜).
 If θ˜ is equal to the upper bound θ then θ˜ does not depend in p2.
 If θ˜ is an interior solution then it is suﬃcient to show that ∂θ˜
∂p2
≤ 0 by
applying the implicit function theorem. Since θ˜ is an interior solution, it
satisﬁes U ′(θ˜) = 0 then
U ′(θ˜) = U ′(θ˜, p2) = 0
Hence
∂θ˜
∂p2
= −
∂U ′
∂p2
∂U ′
∂θ˜
Theorem 5 states that that θ˜ is a maximum then ∂U
′
∂θ˜
= U ′′(θ˜) ≤ 0. From
the deﬁnition of U ′(θ˜, p2) we have
U ′(θ˜, p2) = [− Q
F 2(θ)t
(
∫ θ
θ
sf(s)ds−p1F (θ))+(−1+ Q
F (θ)t
)(θ−p1)+(p2−p1)]f(θ).
then
∂U ′
∂p2
= f(θ˜) > 0.
This concludes the proof.
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4.5 The uniform distribution
In this section, we treat the particular case of a uniform distribution U [θ, θ].
It allows us to have explicit solutions for the equilibrium threshold θ? and the
optimal threshold θ˜.
In the two following propositions, we calculate the values of θ? and θ˜. This will
allow us to study the implications of a change in the prices of parking and of the
maximum length of stay.
Let T = θ − θ.
Proposition 6 The equilibrium (θ?, α?) is given by θ? =
TQ+t(p2+θ)+T
√
(Q+ t
T
(θ+p2))2−4 tT ( tT θp2+Qp1)
2t
,
α? = F (θ?) = θ
?−θ
θ−θ .
(4.3)
Proof. We consider here a uniform distribution supported on the intervall [θ, θ].
The cumulative distribution function F (θ) = 1
T
(θ− θ). From Theorem 4, we have
θ? =
p2 − Qα?tp1
1− Q
α?t
Then
(1− Q
α?t
)θ? = p2 − Q
α?t
p1
(α?t−Q)θ? = α?tp2 −Qp1
Since α? = F (θ?) = θ
?−θ
θ−θ , we have
(
θ? − θ
T
tQ)θ? =
θ? − θ
T
tp2 −Qp1
Hence
t
T
(θ?)2 − ( t
T
(p2 + θ) +Q)θ
? + (
θ
T
tp2 +Qp1) = 0.
44 CHAPTER 4. Downtown Parking with Heterogeneous Consumers
Since θ? > 0 then the equilibrium threshold is given by
θ? =
TQ+ t(p2 + θ) + T
√
(Q+ t
T
(θ + p2))2 − 4 tT ( tT θp2 +Qp1)
2t
Proposition 7 The social optimum θ˜ is given by
θ˜ =
QT
2t
+ p2.
Proof. In the case of a uniform distribution, the total expected payoﬀ is given by
U(θ) = Q
F (θ)t
( 1
T
∫ θ
θ
sds)− Q
t
p1 +
1
T
∫ θ
θ
sds− p2(1− F (θ))
= Q
2t
(θ + θ)− Q
t
p1 +
1
2T
(θ
2 − θ2)− p2( θ−θT ).
The FOC gives
U ′(θ) =
Q
2t
− 1
T
θ +
p2
T
hence
θ˜ =
QT
2t
+ p2
4.5.1 Comparative statics and policy implications
The results of the comparative statics are helpful to determine policy eﬀects.
The goal of the analysis is to understand the impacts of the p1, p2 and t on the
equilibrium distribution of the population α?, the socially optimal distribution α˜
and the total expected payoﬀ of the population. The result is given in the following
proposition.
Proposition 8 The eﬀects of changes in p1, p2 and t are summarized in Table 4.1.
Where the sign '+' represents a positive impact, '-' represents a negative impact
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θ? θ˜ Total expected utility U
p1 - 0 -
p2 + + -
t - - -
Table 4.1: Comparative statics regarding p1, p2 and t
Figure 4.1: Equilibrium and optimal proportion of searchers with respect to p1
and '0' represents no impact.
Eﬀect of changes in p1
One interesting result of this model is that p1 has no impact on the optimal
threshold θ˜. However, the table 1 shows that the equilibrium distribution α?
is decreasing in p1. Therefore, increasing the on-street price achieves two goals:
alleviating congestion in cities and reducing the ineﬃciency of the equilibrium
as described in Figure 4.1. However, this policy leads to a decrease of the total
expected payoﬀ.
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Figure 4.2: Equilibrium and optimal proportion of searchers with respect to p2
Eﬀect of changes in p2
Proposition 3 and proposition 5 show that α? and α˜ are both increasing in
p2. Hence, reduction of the congestion can be achieved by lowering the price oﬀ-
street. This result is consistent with that of Calthrop and Proost 2006. They
showed that, when oﬀ-street market is supplied under constant returns to scale,
on-street price and oﬀ-street price should be equal. However, this policy does not
aﬀect the ineﬃciency of the equilibrium as shown in Figure 4.2.
Eﬀect of changes in t
Table 1 shows that parking time t has a negative impact on the three variables
studied. The reduction of parking time is not an eﬀective policy to alleviate
congestion in cities and to enhance consumers to use oﬀ-street parkings as shown
in Figure 4.3. However, it improves social welfare.
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Figure 4.3: Equilibrium and optimal proportion of searchers with respect to the
maximum length of stay t
4.6 Conclusion
The allocation of heterogeneous consumers between on-street parking and garage
parking is investigated in this paper. It aims at studying the eﬀect of heterogeneity
in the choice of consumers. The model shows two important results. First, under
fairly weak assumptions, we prove the existence and uniqueness of a non-trivial
equilibrium. Second, we show the existence of a social optimum. The study of its
properties leads to an important result since it is insensitive to the on-street price.
We also studied the eﬀect of diﬀerent policies in our model, including pricing
policies and maximum length of stay restrictions. Increasing on-street price allows
to reduce congestion but does not improve social welfare. Lowering the garage
parking price seems to be more eﬀective both reducing congestion and improv-
ing social welfare. However, imposing restrictions on parking time does not help
mitigate congestion.
The model presents some simpliﬁcations. It could be improved by consider-
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ing instead of a public garage parking with a ﬁxed fee, an oligopolistic market
structure. It will also be interesting to integrate traﬃc congestion and introduce
cruising for parking access in the model.
The type of model used in this paper is very useful for modeling situations with
heterogeneous agents such as road traﬃc or the allocation of order ﬂow between
a crossing network and a dealer market. It can also be used in other ﬁelds such
as economics of science. Suppose, for example, a continuum of researchers with
diﬀerent abilities must choose between publishing their work in a journal with a
selection committee and a collective book without selection but much less valued
in academic ﬁeld.
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Appendix
Theorem 4
An agent with a willingness to pay θi will choose to look for a spot in the street if
U0(θi, α
?, p1) > U1(θi, p2) (4.4)
That is
(θi − p1)pi(α,Q) > θi − p2
then
p2 − p1pi(α,Q) > θi(1− pi(α,Q)).
We will ﬁrst show that the equilibrium can not be trivial α? 6= 0, 1 and pi(α?, Q) <
1.
 First case : Suppose that α? = 1.
if α? = 1 then all consumers have decided to search for a spot in the street
which means that, at equilibrium, ∀θi, U0(θi, α?, p1) > U1(θi, p2), that is
Q
t
(θi − p1) > θi − p2
Hence
∀θi, θi <
p2 − Qt p1
1− Q
t
.
Since θ is strictly greater than
p2−Qt p1
1−Q
t
, this condition does not hold and
α? = 1 is not an equilibrium.
 Second case : Suppose that α? is close to zero.
If α? is close to 0, then pi(α?, Q) = min{1, Q
α?t
} = 1.
If pi(α?, Q) = 1 then we can write U0(θi, α?, p1) = θi − p1 and U1(θi, p2)) =
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θi − p2. Hence, for all θi, U0 > U1 which leads to α? = 1. This contradicts
the fact that α? is close to zero.
Hence, if an equilibrium exists, it is not trivial and pi(α?, Q) = Q
α?t
< 1.
Eq(4.4) can be rewritten
(θi − p1)Q
αt
> θi − p2
θi <
p2 − p1 Qαt
1− Q
αt
= θ?(α). (4.5)
Thus, for all θi ∈ [θ, θ?(α)[, U0(θi, α, p1) > U1(θi, p2) and ∀θi ∈]θ?(α), θ], U0(θi, α, p1) <
U1(θi, p2). Then, for a given proportion of consumers choosing to park in the street,
the optimal strategy for a consumer with a willingness to pay θi is given by
g(θi, α) = {
1 if U0(θi, α, p1) ≥ U1(θi, p2),
0 if U1(θi, p2) > U0(θi, α, p1).
For θi ≤ θ?(α), the agent chooses to search a spot in the street and for θi >
θ?(α), she directly goes to the garage parking. At the equilibrium, the proportion
of consumers choosing to search, α, is equal to
α = E[g(θ, α)] =
∫ θ?(α)
θ
g(θ, α)m(θ)dθ+
∫ θ
θ?(α)
g(θ, α)m(θ)dθ = F (θ?(α)) (4.6)
The two equations (4.5) and (4.6) guarantee the existence and the uniqueness of
the equilibrium.
Theorem 5
Let us ﬁrst prove the existence of a socially optimal threshold θ˜.
The function U is deﬁned on a compact set [θ, θ] and is continuous on θ˜. The
existence of a solution of minθ˜∈[θ,θ] U(θ˜) is guaranteed by the Weierstrass Theorem.
Moreover, the social optimal θ˜ is such that Q
α˜t
≤ 1 where α˜ = F (θ˜).
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Suppose that Q
α˜t
> 1, then ∃θ1 > θ˜ such that Qα˜t > Qα1t > 1
U(θ1) =
∫ θ1
θ
(θ − p1)m(θ)dθ +
∫ θ
θ1
(θ − p2)m(θ)dθ
= E(θ)− p1F (θ1)− p2(1− F (θ1)
= E(θ) + (p2 − p1)F (θ1)− p2.
For θ1 > θ˜, F (θ1) > F (θ˜), then U(θ1) > U(θ˜) which contradicts the fact that θ˜ is
optimal.
The ineﬃciency of the equilibrium :
To show that the equilibrium θ? is not eﬃcient, we can distinguish two cases
 θ˜ is such that Q
F (θ˜)t
= 1. In this case θ˜ < θ? since from Proposition 1,
Q
F (θ?)t
< 1 therefore F (θ?) > F (θ˜) which proves the result.
 θ˜ is such that Q
F (θ˜)t
< 1. In this case, it is suﬃcient to prove that for all
θ ≥ θ?, U ′(θ) < 0. That is, for all θ ≥ θ?, U(θ) < U(θ?) and it exists θ < θ?,
U(θ) > U(θ?) which means that θ? is ineﬃcient and the social optimum
θ˜ = argmax{U(θ)} < θ?. For θ ∈ [θ, θ], we have
U(θ) =
∫ θ
θ
U0(s)f(s)ds+
∫ θ
θ
U1(s)f(s)ds
= pi(θ,Q)
∫ θ
θ
(s− p1)f(s)ds+
∫ θ
θ
(s− p2)f(s)ds
= Q
F (θ)t
[
∫ θ
θ
sf(s)ds− p1F (θ)] +
∫ θ
θ
sf(s)ds− p2(1− F (θ))
= (−1 + Q
F (θ)t
)[
∫ θ
θ
sf(s)ds− p1F (θ)] + E(θ) + (p2 − p1)F (θ)− p2.
The derivative of this expression with respect to θ is
U ′(θ) = − Qf(θ)
F 2(θ)t
(
∫ θ
θ
sf(s)ds− p1F (θ)) + (−1 + QF (θ)t)(θf(θ)− p1f(θ)) + (p2 − p1)f(θ)
= [− Q
F 2(θ)t
(
∫ θ
θ
sf(s)ds− p1F (θ)) + (−1 + QF (θ)t)(θ − p1) + (p2 − p1)]f(θ).
The equilibrium threshold veriﬁes the following equation
θ? =
p2 − QF (θ?)tp1
1− Q
F (θ?)t
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this condition can be expressed as
(1− Q
F (θ?)t
)(θ? − p1) = p2 − p1
and for all θ ≥ θ?,
(1− Q
F (θ)t
)(θ − p1) ≥ p2 − p1
.
By assumption A1, θ > p1 then
− Q
F 2(θ)t
(
∫ θ
θ
sf(s)ds− p1F (θ)) < 0
Hence, for all θ ∈ [θ?, θ]
U ′(θ) = [− Q
F 2(θ)t
(
∫ θ
θ
sf(s)ds− p1F (θ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ (−1 + Q
F (θ)t
)(θ − p1) + (p2 − p1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
]f(θ) < 0
which concludes the proof.
Proposition 9
First, we recall the expression of the total expected payoﬀ in the case of a uniform
distribution over the segment [θ, θ].
U(θ?) = Q
2t
(θ? + θ)− 1
2T
(θ
2 − θ?2) + p2(1− F (θ?))− Qt p1
Diﬀerentiation with respect to p1
Let us calculate the partial derivative of U(θ?) with respect to p1.
∂U(θ?)
∂p1
=
Q
2t
∂θ?
∂p1
+
1
T
θ?
∂θ?
∂p1
− 1
T
p2
∂θ?
∂p1
− Q
t
=
Q
2t
∂θ?
∂p1
+
1
T
∂θ?
∂p1
(θ? − p2)− Q
t
.
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We already shown that ∂θ
?
∂p1
< 0 and θ? > p2 then
∂U(θ?)
∂p1
< 0
Diﬀerentiation with respect to p2
Let us calculate the partial derivative of U(θ?) with respect to p1
∂U(θ?)
∂p2
=
Q
2t
∂θ?
∂p2
+
1
T
θ?
∂θ?
∂p2
+ (1− F (θ?))− 1
T
p2
∂θ?
∂p2
=
Q
2t
∂θ?
∂p2
+
1
T
∂θ?
∂p2
(θ? − p2) + (1− F (θ?)).
Since ∂θ
?
∂p2
> 0 and θ? − p2 > 0 then ∂U(θ?)∂p2 > 0.
Diﬀerentiation with respect to t
The derivative of the total expected payoﬀ with respect to t is given by :
∂U(θ?)
∂t
=
Q
2t
∂θ?
∂t
− Q
2t2
(θ? + θ) +
1
T
θ?
∂θ?
∂t
− 1
T
p2
∂θ?
∂t
+
Q
2t2
p1
=
1
T
∂θ?
∂t
(θ? − p2) + Q
2t
∂θ?
∂t
+
Q
2t2
(p1 − θ? − θ)
Since θ? > p2 and θ? > p1 and ∂θ
?
∂t
< 0 then ∂U(θ
?)
∂t
< 0.

CHAPTER 5
Paradigm Shift
This chapter is based on the paper "Paradigm shift : A mean ﬁeld game ap-
proach" which is a joint work with Professor Damien Besancenot (Besancenot and
Dogguy 2014).
Abstract
This chapter analyses the consequences of young researchers' scientiﬁc choice
on the dynamics of sciences. We develop a simple two-state mean ﬁeld game
model to analyze the competition between two paradigms based on Kuhn's theory
of scientiﬁc revolution. The dynamics of the model is driven by the scientiﬁc choice
of young researchers at the beginning of their career. Despite the possibility of
multiple equilibria, the model exhibits at least one stable solution in which both
paradigms coexist. The occurrence of shocks on the parameters may induce the
shift from one paradigm to the other. During this shift, researchers' choice is
proved to be having a great impact on the evolution of sciences.
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5.1 Introduction
Social sciences, among other disciplines, are consistently subject to conceptual
or methodological swings. In economics for instance, Transaction Costs analysis
gave way to Agency Theory, Endogenous Growth appeared at the expense of Stan-
dard Growth Theory and, more recently, Behavioral Finance deeply challenged the
standard Eﬃcient Market Hypothesis. Such an evolution suggests the existence of
life cycles aﬀecting research agendas or paradigm shifts, a core concept developed
in Kuhn 1970.
In a broad sense, a paradigm may be deﬁned as a set of theories and empirical
methodologies which allow a scientiﬁc community to identify, frame and solve
problems and serve as a foundation for future scientiﬁc discoveries. During periods
of normal science, the dominant paradigm helps report interesting or surprising
ﬁndings and remains dominant as long as it stays attractive for the large majority
of researchers. 1 During a paradigm shift, two simultaneous changes are supposed
to occur: the decline of the old paradigm, when the paradigm begins to fail solving
problems and explaining anomalies and the emergence of a new one when a new
theoretical corpus leads to the publication of promising results. During these
changes, the hope of new discoveries modiﬁes the scientiﬁc choices of researchers
who progressively abandon the traditional ﬁelds of research in favor of a new set
of assumptions.
Driven ﬁrst by scientiﬁc considerations, the paradigm shift also appears as a
social fact involving the entire community of scientists. During crises, the increase
in the number of researchers involved in the new scientiﬁc approach induces a social
phenomenon which cumulatively fosters its attractivity. The presence of more
researchers in an academic ﬁeld simultaneously increases the potential audience
for a given research, makes it easier to ﬁnd eﬃcient co-writers, guarantees an
easier access to publication mediums and contributes to simplifying the funding
of research. The expansion of the scientiﬁc community interested in a scientiﬁc
1. Hereafter, we will refer to as "dominant paradigm", the paradigm which attracts the
majority of researchers and thus deﬁnes what can be considered as orthodoxy. Other approaches,
sustained by a minority of researchers, will be qualiﬁed as "dominated paradigms".
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ﬁeld thus inﬂuences per se the researchers' scientiﬁc choice. When the new set
of assumptions attracts most of the new generation of scientists, researchers who
stay working in the old school see their inﬂuence diminished and their contribution
rapidly marginalized.
Demographic elements also contribute to the dynamics of science. History of
sciences provides various examples to illustrate the fact that the retirement of one
generation of elite scientists and their replacement by a new generation allows the
latter to develop new theories or approaches more easily (Barber 1961).
Besides, one cannot neglect the stimulus brought to researchers through paradigm
competition. According to Kuhn 1970, "Competition between segments of the sci-
entiﬁc community is the only historical process that ever actually results in the
rejection of one previously accepted theory or in the adoption of another". Dur-
ing periods of normal science, opponents to the dominant approach highlight the
existence of anomalies which seem inconsistent with the leading paradigm. In an-
swer, supporters of the paradigm spend a large part of their career in the process
of puzzle solving, an activity which allows to comfort the established framework.
Paradigm competition appears as one additional driving forces of scientiﬁc pro-
ductivity.
We aim at considering the various determinants of paradigm shifts. In partic-
ular, we mainly focuse on the researchers' choice of their scientiﬁc agenda and the
consequences of such choices in the general evolution of science.
If this approach clearly deals with various aspects of Kuhn's work, we do not
claim to formalize his theory. Our purpose is to focus on the various conditions
that contribute to the decline of a paradigm and the shift to a new one. For this
purpose, we build a highly stylized mean ﬁeld game closely related to Guéant's
(2009) description of the workers' choices in a two-sector economy.
We consider, here, an economy with a continuum of researchers and two com-
peting paradigms. Researchers produce homogeneous papers according to a pro-
duction function which reﬂects the competition between the two paradigms. At
each point in time, a fraction of researchers quit academia. They are replaced
by an equivalent number of young researchers. Each of them has to choose in
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which paradigm he or she wants to carry out his or her work. Two factors mo-
tivate the choice of these young researchers at the beginning of their career: the
intertemporal remuneration scheme (social or monetary) and personal preferences.
A priori, the young researchers' scientiﬁc choice is ﬁrst inﬂuenced by their aﬃn-
ity with various topics. They will choose according to their taste, their greater or
lesser reluctance to treat the issues at stake or their desire to engage in riskier
issues (Alon 2009). However, in their choice, young scientists cannot ignore the
inﬂuence of the remuneration scheme oﬀered by each of the two paradigms. As any
scientist, a young researcher seeks social recognition, a recognition which comes
with the publication of new results and is dramatically linked to the possibility
of creating and disseminating new knowledge (Stephan 1996). Besides, monetary
compensation is highly related to the academic resume and the individual scientiﬁc
production of the researcher (see for instance A. M. Diamond 1986 and Swidler and
Goldreyer 1998). As this scientiﬁc production is inﬂuenced by the proportion of
researchers working in the same paradigm, the dynamics of the population distri-
bution between the two paradigms has a crucial inﬂuence on the young researchers'
choice.
According to the initial values of the parameters, our model may exhibit one
or two stable equilibria. In each equilibrium, the two paradigms always coexist;
one paradigm attracts the majority of the researchers (it is therefore dominant)
while the other remains in the minority (and is dominated). In these equilibria,
coexistence is due to the voluntary choice by some young researchers of a research
agenda in the dominated paradigm, even if this agenda is not intended to lead to
major innovations.
When the model allows for two stable equilibria, the equations give no indi-
cation as to which of the two competing paradigms should become predominant.
Both paradigms could possibly become dominant and the hierarchy is inherited
from the history of the scientiﬁc ﬁeld which led to the initial distribution of re-
searchers between the two paradigms (for instance, one of the paradigms may have
existed for some time and is partially depleted while the other is just emerging).
In this case, a paradigm shift may occur if random shocks on the parameters
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contribute to eliminating the dominant paradigm as a stable equilibrium. Af-
ter such shocks, the vast majority of young researchers will be attracted by the
new paradigm which allows for a rising remuneration as long as the number of
researchers involved in the paradigm increases.
While analyses of the dynamics of sciences belong now to a well established
ﬁeld of research in economics, there are only few theoretical analyses that of-
fer a formal model of paradigms evolution. As a related work, we can refer to
Sterman and Wittenberg 1999 who provide a Kuhnian dynamic model in which
paradigm changes are conditioned by positive feedback loops. Bramoullé and Saint
Paul 2010 developed an overlapping generation model in which researchers allocate
their working time between old or new ﬁelds of research in order to maximize the
authors' reward. At each period, one paper published in a given paradigm yields
both a citation premium increasing with the future number of contributions to the
paradigm and a direct remuneration linked to the intrinsic value of the paper. The
model exhibits solutions with various properties according to the values of the pa-
rameters. The model allows for periods of emergence of new paradigms and periods
of exploitation of old ones. In some cases, sunspots may occur where expectations
of a high payoﬀ in investment in a scientiﬁc ﬁeld attract lots of researchers and
allow for self-fulﬁlling expectations. More recently, Faria et al. 2011 worked out
a hierarchical diﬀerential game between editors and authors. The production of
scientiﬁc knowledge is analyzed as the extraction of potential knowledge seen as an
exhaustible resource. Editors can accelerate or slow down knowledge production
and paradigm depletion may occur when editors allow for a fast rate of knowledge
extraction. This model considers paradigm depletion as the result of an optimal
process but does not directly deal with the problem of paradigm shift. Within the
literature available, our model presents a greater aﬃnity with the work of Brock
and Durlauf 1999 who developed a model in which researchers' scientiﬁc choice
is made by reference to conformity. Their model puts a special emphasis on the
tendency for individual scientists to place a greater weight on theories accepted by
the majority of the academic community. Under this assumption, the authors put
forward a multiplicity of equilibria and the possibility of jumping from one equi-
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librium to the other in case of shock on the parameters. Our approach diﬀers from
this work in three ways. First we develop a model in which the arguments of the
scientiﬁc choice are directly linked to the scientiﬁc reward scheme. In their choice,
researchers perfectly take into account the future possibilities of paper publications
and the social and monetary rewards that come with the academic resume. Sec-
ond, our model allows for the taking into account of the demographic dimension
of the problem and its inﬂuence on the paradigm shift. Third, the model is built
on the mean ﬁeld game approach introduced in the ﬁrst chapter.
In a standard Mean Field Game, the dynamics of the system is governed by
two equations: a backward Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation describing the op-
timal behavior of agents given the distribution of the other players and a forward
Kolmogorov equation which takes into account the inﬂuence of each player on the
mean ﬁeld. The Nash equilibrium of the game appears as the solution of these two
equations. In this model, we consider a simpliﬁed model based upon a system of
ordinary diﬀerential equations while keeping the general characteristics of a mean
ﬁeld game. Here the mean ﬁeld is formalized by the distribution of researchers
between two competing paradigms. It reﬂects the historical choices made by the
successive generations of researchers and inﬂuences the young researcher's choice
through the reward scheme in a dynamic framework.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some stylized facts about
paradigm shifts in growth theory. Section 3 introduces our main assumptions about
the researcher's payoﬀs, their productivity and the dynamics of the model, given
the young researchers' choice. Section 4 provides a numerical simulation of the
model for various values of the parameters and discusses the results in terms of
paradigm shifts. A last section concludes the chapter.
5.2 An example of paradigm shifts: Growth The-
ory
Since the second half of the last century, growth theory has given rise to four
diﬀerent approaches, each new theory challenging the previous one. In order to
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Figure 5.1: Citations of seminal papers in Growth Theory
emphasize their interaction, Figure 5.1 considers ﬁve seminal papers and measures
the inﬂuence of the paradigm that they helped to found through the relative num-
ber of their citations. For each period, Figure 5.1 gives the ratio between the
number of citations received by a paper and the number of papers linked to "Eco-
nomic Growth" according to Google Scholar. In the WWII aftermath, growth
theory was mostly inﬂuenced by the main contributions of Harrod 1939 and Do-
mar 1946. Growth was considered in a Keynesian perspective and, if the authors
showed that the economic system could follow an equilibrium growth path (on a
knife-edge), they also stated that there was no natural reason for an economy to
achieve balanced growth since the system has no equilibrating force. The paper by
Solow 1956 brought an opposite conception of growth. According to the "neoclas-
sical" model, long-run growth must be stable. However, as growth is linked to the
accumulation of capital, the diminishing returns of capital imply that economies
must eventually reach a steady state. At this stage, any increase in capital will no
longer induce growth and economies can only continue growing by inventing new
technologies. In this approach, the process by which countries continue growing
is "exogenous". Figure 1 illustrates both the growing inﬂuence of this new ap-
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proach from the mid-60s to the late 70s and, during the same period, the relative
loss of interest of the economists for the Harrod-Domar model. It is worth noting
that even if from the mid-60s the relative number of papers explicitly referring
to Domar's contribution follow a stable decreasing path, the paper has still been
receiving an important number of citations. Even though it is a minority, there are
still a signiﬁcant number of researchers working on the topic of the old dominant
paradigm.
To a lesser extent, the overlapping generation model initiated by P. A. Diamond
1965 underlaid a new strand of research. Relaxing the assumption of inﬁnitely lived
agents, this approach highlights the possibility for the decentralized competitive
equilibrium to be diﬀerent from that of the social planner's choice and indeed
even not to be Pareto eﬃcient. Once again, Figure 5.1 shows that the progressive
success of this approach came simultaneously with a relative decline in the inﬂuence
of Solow's neoclassical model.
A more interesting phenomenon occured in the late 80s and the early 90s
with the ﬁrst papers unveiling the possibility of endogenous growth. During this
period, economists unsatisﬁed with Solow's explanation worked to "endogenize"
technology. They developed a new growth theory that includes an explanation of
technological advancement. Research in this area focused on education, innovation
and technological change. In this new paradigm, economic growth became an
endogenous outcome of the economic system. Figure 5.1 considers the inﬂuence
of this new paradigm through two contributions by Romer 1986, 1990. After the
publication of the ﬁrst paper, more economists started working on this new theory
at the expense of the OLG model which lost attractivity: a new paradigm shift
occurred. However, as Romer 1986 explicitly traced his work back to Solow's model
and recognizing it as a continuation of the previous work, the interest of Solow's
seminal paper was clearly renewed and its relative number of citations exploded.
Here, the old paradigm clearly beneﬁted from the development of the new one and
the new paradigm developed by reference to the old one.
The model in the next section will attempt to capture the stylized facts high-
lighted by the evolution of growth theory.
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5.3 The model
We consider an academic world made up of a continuum of researchers of size 1.
Each researcher practices his/her skills in one of the two available paradigms. Here-
after, a researcher working in paradigm i will be referred to as an i− researcher.
Except for their preferences, researchers are assumed to be homogeneous.
At each point in time, a fraction of researchers quit the academic world (through
voluntary departure, or involuntarily through retirement or death) and are replaced
by an equivalent number of new researchers. Young researchers have then to de-
cide in which paradigm they want to carry out their research. This decision is
ﬁnal. The choice will depend on the researchers' reward structure which includes
two diﬀerent items: an intrinsic remuneration linked to the researcher's aﬃnity
with his/her research agenda, and an extrinsic one which results from his/her re-
search activity. The assumption that a young researcher makes a deﬁnitive choice
of his/her research topic at the beginning of his/her career is purely technical.
However, it perfectly matches with Kuhn's quotation of Max Plank: "a new scien-
tiﬁc truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents [...], but rather because
its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with
it" (Kuhn 1970, p.150). It reﬂects the resistance by senior researchers to scientiﬁc
changes. 2
5.3.1 Researchers extrinsic remuneration
The extrinsic reward of an academic work is composed of two diﬀerent elements:
a social reward linked to the interest paid by the scientiﬁc community to the
researcher's work and a ﬁnancial reward, typically the salary of the researcher.
These elements will be formalized through three main variables:
 Let us denote by Qi(t) the number of papers published at date t by a repre-
sentative i−researcher (papers quality is assumed to be homogeneous and
2. After a paradigm shift, an academic resume incorporating mostly papers written in the
former dominant paradigm would be highly devaluated. The more the time spent in a dominant
paradigm, the higher the cost in case of paradigm shift.
64 CHAPTER 5. Paradigm Shift
Qi(t) also gives a qualitative measure of the scientiﬁc production of the
i−researchers). According to Merton 1957, the scientiﬁc community awards
recognition for being the ﬁrst to communicate a new knowledge. Publica-
tion, which is a necessary step in establishing priorities, thus appears as a
proof of eﬃciency and the larger the number of publications in an academic
resume the higher the peer social recognition (Stephan 1996). Moreover, the
ﬁnancial part of the researchers' reward is largely inﬂuenced by his/her aca-
demic resume. The role played by the number of publications or citations in
an academic career has largely been documented in the academic literature
(A. M. Diamond 1986 or Swidler and Goldreyer 1998). Hereafter, social and
monetary rewards will thus be assumed increasing with Qi(t).
 Let Ni(t) denote the number of i − researchers at date t. The greater the
population of researchers potentially interested in a scientist's work, the more
his/her work will be cited and the larger will be his/her scientiﬁc reputation.
Thus, the researcher's social reward in paradigm i increases with Ni(t). 3
 As funding agencies may want to promote some speciﬁc research, they may
oﬀer special subsidies to researchers involved in this ﬁeld of research. In the
paper at hand, mi ∈ [1,∞] measures the level of these monetary incentives.
When mi = 1, funding agencies provide no incentive for researchers to work
in the scientiﬁc area i. For mi > 1, the higher is mi and the higher are the
incentives to become a i-researcher.
Finally, we assume that the instantaneous value, ωi(t), of the researchers' ex-
trinsic remuneration (social and monetary) presents a multiplicative shape and is
given by:
ωi(t) = ωi(mi, Ni(t), Qi(t)) = miNi(t)Qi(t)
3. Remunerations usually depend on the relative position of researchers among peers and
should not necessarily be increasing with Ni(t): A more realistic model should take into account
this dimension (for instance, see Besancenot et al. 2012 for a model in which rankings inﬂuence
the researchers' remuneration). However, this cannot be taken into account in this model where
all i− researchers present the same instantaneous academic production.
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and, at date t the intertemporal expected remuneration for an i − researcher is
given by:
ui (t) = E
[∫ t+T
t
ωi (mi, Ni (s) , Qi (s)) e
−α(s−t)ds
]
(5.1)
Here α is the discount rate and T is a random variable that indicates the time
spent in the research ﬁeld i by an i − researcher. Assuming that the variable T
follows an exponential law of rate λ, Eq.(5.1) takes the simpliﬁed shape 4:
ui (t) =
∫ ∞
t
ωi (mi, Ni (s) , Qi (s)) e
−(α+λ)(s−t)ds. (5.2)
5.3.2 Speciﬁc assumptions
In order to obtain tractable solutions, the i−researcher 's production function
will be formalized through a classical CES function 5:
Qi(t) = (aiN
r
i (t) + (1− ai) (N−i (t)Q−i (t))r)1/r . (5.3)
where:
1. Ni (t) is the number of i-researchers.
2. N−i (t) is the number of researchers in the competing paradigm. As the
continuum of researchers is of size one, we have N−i (t) +Ni (t) = 1.
4. The exponential law describes the life of an individual when the death occurs at a constant
average rate. The rate parameter λ measures the probability of death of the researcher at each
point in time and represents the reciprocal of the average life of individuals (Balakrishnan and
Basu 1996).
5. Under this assumption, the case Ni = 0 could rise a formal problem as the production
function would allow for some scientiﬁc production in the ﬁeld of research i while no researcher
would be involved in this speciﬁc ﬁeld. In our model, however, this diﬃculty is avoided as the
case Ni = 0 is inconsistent with the equilibrium solution.
66 CHAPTER 5. Paradigm Shift
3. N−i (t)Q−i (t) measures the number of papers published within the compet-
ing paradigm.
4. ai is a speciﬁc constant measuring the dependence of paradigm i with respect
to its rival. A high level of ai reveals an autonomous ﬁeld of research in which
researchers are poorly inﬂuenced by the scientiﬁc activity of the other ﬁeld.
The rationale behind such a function is straightforward. Other things remain-
ing the same, an i-researcher's productivity is fostered by the number Ni(t) of
researchers involved in the same paradigm. More researchers means more confer-
ences in which one can receive critics about his work and discuss with other aca-
demic fellows the new scientiﬁc developments of the paradigm. More researchers
involved in a scientiﬁc ﬁeld also means more opportunity of collaborations which
increase productivity (see for instance Mcdowell and Melvin 1983, Landry et al.
1996 or Abrahamson 2009) and induces a greater number of reviews in which one
can publish his/her work (Stigler et al. 1995).
Besides, competition between paradigms plays a crucial role on scientiﬁc pro-
ductivity. During periods of normal science, while opponents to the dominant
approach highlight the existence of anomalies which seem inconsistent with the
leading paradigm, supporters of the paradigm spend a large part of their career
to comfort the established framework. In economics, a good illustration of such
a phenomenon can be found in the evolution of the eﬃcient market hypothesis
in reaction to the systematic research of anomalies in the ﬁnancial market by
supporters of behavioral ﬁnance (Schwert 2003).
This opposition is formalized by the speciﬁc constant ai which captures the
intrinsic dynamism of the paradigm i and its stage in the paradigm shift. From its
rise until its decline, a paradigm's life is subject to random shocks that aﬀects its
relation vis-à-vis its competitor. In the early years of the new paradigm i, some
researchers are disappointed by the results of the dominant concepts and start
pursuing alternative topics or methodology in the hope that a new set of tools or
assumptions would bring better results. At this stage, the new approach deﬁnes
itself by opposition to the dominant paradigm and ai is rather low. However,
a shock on ai can occur if the new set of assumptions starts allowing to report
5.3. The model 67
interesting or surprising ﬁndings. In such a case, ai increases as authors become
more interested in the development of the new results than by the criticism of the
old ones. Finally, ai may decrease when the most important problems of the ﬁeld
are solved or proven to be unsolvable. In this case, new papers in the ﬁeld bring
fewer innovations and researchers will spend most of their time trying to answer
the critics raised by the competing paradigm.
5.3.3 Intrinsic remuneration and the young researchers' choice
At the beginning of his academic life, each researcher has to choose the sector in
which he/she will work for the rest of his/her life. In this choice, the remuneration
oﬀered by each ﬁeld of research plays a determining role; however, the young
researchers will also take into account their personal preferences among the various
academic ﬁelds (Alon 2009, Stephan 1996). Here, researcher's preferences are
modeled by a random variable µ which measures the value for a young researcher
of building his/her career in the ﬁrst paradigm. By assumption each researcher is
characterized by his/her own µ, and this value is distributed over the researchers'
population according to a standard normal law.
When the two research agendas bring the same intertemporal remuneration
u1 (t) = u2 (t), Cf. Eq. (5.2), a researcher will choose the ﬁrst paradigm for any
µ positive and the second one for a negative µ. When the intertemporal remuner-
ations exhibit signiﬁcant diﬀerences, a young researcher may nevertheless choose
the less remunerative if he/she exhibits strong preferences for this ﬁeld of research.
Formally, the decision rule for a young researcher will choose the ﬁrst area if and
only if 6:
u1 (t) + µ ≥ u2 (t) . (5.4)
Let us consider an inﬁnitesimal interval [t, t+ dt]. According to the previous as-
sumptions, during this time period a proportion λdt of researchers retires both for
6. We made the assumption that the young researchers have perfect foresight.
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sector 1 and sector 2 and a population of size λdt enters the academic world. The
proportion of new researchers that choose sector 1 is given by:
P (u1 (t) + µ ≥ u2 (t)) = F (u1 (t)− u2 (t)) , (5.5)
where F is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal variable.
Thus, the system is governed by the following two equations:
{
N˙1 (t) = −λN1 (t) + λF (u1 (t)− u2 (t))
N˙2 (t) = −λN2 (t) + λF (u2 (t)− u1 (t))
(5.6)
Hereafter, we will use the variable ∆u = u1 − u2.
From Eq.(5.2) and (5.6), we can now describe the dynamics of the model:
Proposition 1 An equilibrium of the mean ﬁeld game is deﬁned by any couple
(N1(t),∆u(t)) which satisﬁes the two dynamic equations 7:
dN1 (t)
dt
= −λN1 (t) + λF (∆u (t))
d∆u (t)
dt
= (α + λ) ∆u (t)− [ω1 (N1 (t) , N2 (t))− ω2 (N1 (t) , N2 (t))]
(5.7)
with an initial condition on N1, N1 (0), and a terminal condition on ∆u,
lim
t→∞
e−(α+λ)t∆u (t) = 0.
Proof. Remark that the ﬁrst equation of the system (5.7) and (5.6) are the same.
In a same way, (5.7) and the terminal condition veriﬁed by ∆u are equivalent to
the integral form (5.2) above. Indeed, after subtraction of the term (α + λ) ∆u (t)
from both sides of (5.7) and multiplication by −e−(α+λ)t we get:
7. The system of diﬀerential equations presented above is typical of mean ﬁeld game. The
ﬁrst equation which is forward can be identiﬁed to the Kolmogorov equation whereas the second
one, backward, replaces the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (Guéant 2009).
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d
[
e−(α+λ)t∆u (t)
]
dt
= −e−(α+λ)t [ω1 (N1 (t) , N2 (t))− ω2 (N1 (t) , N2 (t))] (5.8)
After integration with respect to t, and under the terminal condition, this is equiv-
alent to:
−e−(α+λ)t∆u (t) = −
∫ ∞
t
e−(α+λ)s [ω1 (N1(s), N2(s))− ω2 (Ns(t), N2(s))] ds, (5.9)
which ﬁnally leads to Eq.(5.2):
∆u (t) =
∫ ∞
t
e−(α+λ)(s−t) [ω1 (N1 (s) , N2 (s))− ω2 (N1 (s) , N2 (s))] ds. (5.10)
5.3.4 Properties of the steady states
The next proposition states the main result of the paper :
Proposition 2
The dynamical system of Eq.(5.7) admits at least one steady state equilibrium
given by:
N∗1 = F
(
ω1 (N
∗
1 , 1−N∗1 )− ω2 (N∗1 , 1−N∗1 )
α + λ
)
∆u∗ =
ω1 (N
∗
1 , 1−N∗1 )− ω2 (N∗1 , 1−N∗1 )
α + λ
(5.11)
Proof. From Eq.(5.7) a steady state satisﬁes the following condition :{
0 = −λN1 + λF (∆u)
0 = (α + λ) ∆u− [ω1 (N1, 1−N1)− ω2 (N1, 1−N1)]
(5.12)
The second equation gives ∆u∗; plugging ∆u∗ in the ﬁrst equation leads to
N∗1 . The existence of this solution is a simple application of the intermediate value
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theorem. Indeed, as ωi = miNiQi, the diﬀerence ω1 − ω2 is bounded, hence if we
consider the function :
f (N1) = N1 − F
(
1
α+λ
(ω1 (N1, 1−N1)− ω2 (N1, 1−N1))
)
we get f (0) < 0 and f (1) > 0. This concludes the proof.
It now remains to study the dynamical properties of the system and the nature
of each steady state. Let us linearize the system (5.7) in the neighborhood of each
steady state (N∗1 ,∆u
∗) :
{
dN1
dt
(t) = −λN1 (t) + λ∆u (t)F ′ (∆u∗)
d∆u
dt
(t) = (α + λ) ∆u (t)− [∂1ω1 − ∂2ω2 − ∂1ω2 + ∂2ω2] (N∗1 , 1−N∗1 )N1 (t)
The nature of the steady state is given by the sign of the eigenvalues of the
following matrix :
M =
(
−λ λF ′ (∆u∗)
− [∂1ω1 − ∂2ω2 − ∂1ω2 + ∂2ω2] (N∗1 , 1−N∗1 ) α + λ
)
Proposition 3
Under the transversality condition : lim
t→∞
e−(α+λ)t∆u (t) = 0, any initial condi-
tion on N1(0) leads to a convergent path towards a stable steady state equilibrium
of the model.
Proof. The mean ﬁeld equation Eq.(5.7) presents the evolution of the system
at the equilibrium. It is a coupled Forward/Backward system of equations which
is diﬃcult to study since we do not know the value of ∆u at t = 0. Transver-
sality condition links ∆u at t = 0 with the value of N1(t) at equilibrium and
guarantees that for any initial value N1(0), the equilibrium (N1(t),∆u(t)) con-
verges to a stable steady state. Imagine that the terminal condition is veriﬁed
on a trajectory that diverges. Since ωi is bounded there exists C > 0 such that
∀N ∈ [0, 1], |ω1 (N, 1−N) − ω2 (N, 1−N) | ≤ C. From proposition 1 and under
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the transversality condition, ∆u(t) is given by :
∆u (t) =
∫ ∞
t
ω1 (N1 (s) , 1−N1 (s))− ω2 (N1 (s) , 1−N1 (s)) e−(α+λ)(s−t)ds
⇒ |∆u (t) | ≤
∫ ∞
t
|ω1 (N1 (s) , 1−N1 (s))− ω2 (N1 (s) , 1−N1 (s)) |e−(α+λ)(s−t)ds
⇒ |∆u (t) | ≤ C
∫ ∞
t
e−(α+λ)(s−t)ds
⇒ |∆u (t) | ≤ C
α + λ
But, by assumption, lim
t→∞
|∆u (t) | = +∞. This is not possible then this trajec-
tory is not compatible with the terminal condition on ∆u.
5.4 Numerical simulations
We have seen above that the diﬀerential system admits at least one steady state
Eq.(5.11) but the number of solutions depends upon the value of the variables a1,
a2,m1 and m2. In this section, we consider three important cases presented in
table 5.1. Hereafter, we will take r = 0.25.
case a1 a2 m1 m2 Number of stationary solutions
Case 1 0.5 0.5 1 1 3
Case 2 0.2 0.6 1 1 1
Case 3 0.6 0.2
1 1 1
1 1.5 3
Table 5.1: Table of parameter values
5.4.1 Case 1 : The two paradigms are symmetric
In Figure 5.2 we plot the graph of the identity function on [0, 1] and the function
N1 7→ F
(
ω1 − ω2
α + λ
)
. It shows the existence of three ﬁxed points which are N∗,11 =
0.0493, N∗,21 = 0.5 and N
∗,3
1 = 0.9506.
72 CHAPTER 5. Paradigm Shift
Fixed point value Determinant Nature
N∗,11 0.0493 −0.0023 Saddle point
N∗,21 0.5 0.0020 Repulsive point
N∗,31 0.9506 −0.0023 Saddle point
Table 5.2: Dynamical properties of stationary solutions
To study the nature of each steady states, we have to compute the determi-
nant of the matrix M in each steady state. The results in table 5.2 indicate that
equilibria N∗,11 and N
∗,3
1 are stable.
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Figure 5.2: Case 1 : The two paradigms are symmetric
5.4.2 Case 2 : Paradigm 2 is more active
In this case a1 < a2. The unique ﬁxed point is equal to N∗1 = 0.0083 as
shown in ﬁgure. The stationary solution of the system is a saddle point since the
determinant of the matrix M is equal to -0.0047.
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Figure 5.3: Case 2 : paradigm 2 is more active
Fixed point value Determinant Nature
N∗,11 0.2461 −0.003 Saddle point
N∗,21 0.5024 0.0034 Repulsive point
N∗,31 0.9916 −0.0046 Saddle point
Table 5.3: Dynamical properties of stationary solutions
5.4.3 Case 3 : Paradigm 1 is more active
In this case, a1 > a2. When m1 = 1 and m2 = 1.5, there exist three steady
states as represented by the dashed curve in ﬁgure 5.4. However, the institutional
factor may considerably change the dynamic properties of the system. Indeed,
when m1 = m2 = 1, the system admits a unique ﬁxed point with N
∗,3
1 = 0.9916
and ∆u∗ = 2.3953. This solution is a saddle point since the determinant of the
matrix M is equal to -0.0047. The results are summarized in table 5.3.
If paradigm 2 was initially dominant, the disparition of equilibrium N∗,11 implies
a paradigm shift with a dynamic convergence toward equilibrium N∗,31 .
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Figure 5.4: Case 3 : paradigm 1 is more active
5.4.4 The paradigm shift
Whatever be the case considered in the previous section, the two competing
paradigms always coexist in equilibrium. However, in the stable equilibria the
academic landscape is asymmetric by nature. One scientiﬁc approach appears
as dominant, attracting a large majority of researchers, while the other, clearly
dominated, is in minority. Coexistence is guaranteed in this equilibrium because
each paradigm is the complement of the other. The dominant ﬁeld of research is
stimulated by the researchers' critics from the competing research ﬁeld while these
researchers ﬁnd easily matters for criticism in the massive scientiﬁc production of
the dominant paradigm. Note that, in case 1, the two paradigms could be poten-
tially dominant. The hierarchy between the two paradigms is only due to historical
choices made by past researchers who mostly chose one of the two paradigms.
In this model, paradigm shifts may appear as the consequence of successive
and unanticipated shocks on the values of the parameters. Shocks may aﬀect the
relative values of ai or be the consequence of political choices that aﬀect the mi
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values.
Note ﬁrst that the number of stable equilibria is highly dependent on the
relative ai values. Figure 5.5 maps the total number of steady states of the model
according to the values of the variables a1 and a2 when m1 = m2 = 1. With a
small ai paradigm i has only little chance to become dominant. During periods
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Figure 5.5: Number of steady states of the model
of normal science, researchers only focus on the development of the dominant
paradigm (hereafter paradigm 2, with N1 = N
∗,1
1 in Figure 5.2). Researchers are
mainly interested in improving the assumptions or methodology inside paradigm 2
and a2 is close to one. In such a period, results from the dominated ﬁeld of research
are neglected in the scientiﬁc debate and researchers involved in these topics have
to deﬁne themselves in opposition to the dominant paradigm, a1 is low.
Apparition of anomalies brings an important shock to the model and changes
the nature of the equilibrium. As more puzzles appear inconsistent with dominant
concepts, new possibilities of analysis are considered by young researchers who
start studying these problems with a greater autonomy, a1 rises. At the same
time, researchers from the dominant paradigm have to spend more time to address
the criticisms of their challengers: a2 drops. Under our speciﬁc assumptions this
implies a lower number of publications in the dominant ﬁeld and a slide in the
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social and monetary remuneration for researchers involved in this paradigm. As the
opposite eﬀects are at work in the other ﬁeld, it becomes more attractive for young
researchers. When a radical change aﬀects a1 and a2, the model can reach the
situation described by the continuous curve of Case 2. In this situation, the steady
state equilibrium with N∗,11 disappears and the model presents a unique stable
equilibrium in which the old paradigm 2 is dominated. There is a paradigm shift
during which the number of researchers attracted by new topics raises continuously.
Greater social recognition and higher wages are the two incentives that attract the
young scientists in the new paradigm and the impact of this massive attraction.
At the end of the adjustment process, a new steady state is reached in which
proponents of the paradigm 2 remain active - but with a minority status.
Note that the paradigm shift may also be caused or hindered by public policy.
Political decisions may change the relative values of m1 and m2 and consolidate or
reduce the dominance of one paradigm. For instance, by granting salary rises or
bonuses in case of publication in top tier journals, the public authorities mainly
increase the reward of researchers working within the dominant paradigm. The mi
value associated with this paradigm increases which reinforces its dominant status.
5.5 Conclusion
The two-state mean ﬁeld game developed in this chapter formalizes the com-
petition between two paradigms in an academic ﬁeld, giving a central role to the
young researchers' choice in the dynamics of science.
Three major insights emerge from the model. First, for any set of parameters,
there always exists a stable steady state equilibrium. In this equilibrium, both
paradigms coexist in a hierarchical order. Second, changes in the reward schemes
are able to challenge this hierarchical order. An increase in the productivity in one
paradigm or the implementation of incentives in favor of one of the two paradigms
clearly contributes to the reinforcement of this particular set of assumptions and
tools. Third, important shocks on the parameters may cause the equilibrium with
the dominating paradigm to disappear. In this case, one can observe a paradigm
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shift with the progressive replacement of former major scientists involved in the
old paradigm by new generations of researchers, an increasing number of whom
will be choosing the new paradigm.
In order to keep the analysis tractable, this model is built on some restrictive
assumptions. For instance, the model considers that young researchers make a
deﬁnitive choice at the beginning of their academic life; future work should consider
the possibility of a radical revision of the researchers' agenda. Moreover, in order
to obtain an analytical characterization of the equilibrium solution, some speciﬁc
assumptions have been made about the reward structure and the functional forms
of academic production. These assumptions may be questioned in order to assess
the accuracy of the model.
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Résumé
Dans cette thèse nous nous intéressons à l'application de la théorie des jeux à
champ moyen en économie. Cette nouvelle branche de la théorie des jeux permet
d'étudier les systémes impliquant un grand nombre d'agents en utilisant la notion
de champ moyen empruntée à la physique statistique. Cette méthode réduit con-
sidérablement la compléxité des interactions. Le premier modèle est consacré à
l'étude des logiciles et montre que la tolérance du piratage peut être un moyen ef-
ﬁcace contre la propagation des logiciels libres. Le deuxième modèle est un modèle
de champ moyen statique et traite du problème de stationnement dans les villes en
introduisant de l'hétérogénéité dans la population des consommateurs. Cela nous
permet de mieux évaluer les politiques publiques mises en oeuvre. Le troisième
modèle analyse, dans un cadre dynamique, les conséquences du choix des jeunes
chercheurs sur la dynamique des sciences.
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Abstract
In this thesis we study the application of Mean Field Game Theory in eco-
nomics. This new branch of game theory is devoted to the study of systems
involving a large number of interacting agents using the notion of mean ﬁeld from
Statistical Physics. This method reduces greatly the complexity of interactions.
The ﬁrst model is devoted to the study of Software market and shows that toler-
ance of piracy can be an eﬀective strategy in order to limit the diﬀusion of free
softwares. The second model is a static mean ﬁeld game and addresses the prob-
lem of parking in cities by introducing heterogeneity among agents. This allows
us to evaluate public policies. The third model analysis, in a dynamic setting, the
consequences of the choice of young researchers on the dynamics of science.
